Lessons from history (NOFORN 1981)

It was during Richard M. Nixon’s first presidential visit to Paris in 1969 that White House aide John D. Ehrlichman discovered that friends sometimes spy on friends.
After retrieving his coat from a butler in the official guest house one morning, Ehrlichman discovered a small pin with a listening device clumsily stuck in the lining, apparently by French intelligence agents.   
“I gave it to the Secret Service boys, and they shrugged,” Ehrlichman recalled this week. “It was business as usual.”
A secret 1981 message from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stamped “NOFORN” - meaning not to be shown to any foreigners - gives some indication of U.S. interest in friends as well as foes.
The message instructs military attaches and other intelligence officers to report on a continuing basis on the intelligence services of Canada, Israel, West Germany, Greece and 30 other nations, it demands “detailed information” on their “locations, operations, capabilities, intentions, effectiveness personnel, equipment, communications and capabilities, power and influence, procedures, funding and support (internal and external), training, doctrine and policy, uni-forms, insignia and credentials.”
“Information concerning operations, methods, influence, organization and general activities of the intelligence and security services of countries, which are either friendly or co-operating with the United States, has become highly important to army planning and Opsec.”

Nobody spying on Germany's leader

President Barack Obama didn't know the United States was collecting communications of allied leaders such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
With the latest revelations from Snowden threatening to roil diplomatic relations in Europe, South America and elsewhere, the Obama administration maintained its firm and consistent response to all seeking answers -- we're not admitting anything, but we'll change it for the better.
"I'm not here to talk about classified information. What I am confirming is the fact that we're undergoing a complete review of how our intelligence operates outside of the country," the President told Fusion TV.

"I'm not here to talk about classified information. What I am confirming is the fact that we're undergoing a complete review of how our intelligence operates outside of the country."
"We give them policy direction, but what we've seen over the last several years is their capacities continue to develop and expand, and that's why I'm initiating now a review to make sure that what they're able to do doesn't necessarily mean what they should be doing," the President said.

More: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/28/politics/white-house-stopped-wiretaps/

NSA Pose as Diplomats

A "top secret" classified NSA document from the year 2010 shows that a unit known as the "Special Collection Service" (SCS) is operational in Berlin, among other locations. It is an elite corps run in concert by the US intelligence agencies NSA and CIA.
The secret list reveals that its agents are active worldwide in around 80 locations, 19 of which are in Europe -- cities such as Paris, Madrid, Rome, Prague and Geneva. The SCS maintains two bases in Germany, one in Berlin and another in Frankfurt. That alone is unusual. But in addition, both German bases are equipped at the highest level and staffed with active personnel.
The SCS teams predominantly work undercover in shielded areas of the American Embassy and Consulate, where they are officially accredited as diplomats and as such enjoy special privileges. Under diplomatic protection, they are able to look and listen unhindered. They just can't get caught.
Wiretapping from an embassy is illegal in nearly every country. But that is precisely the task of the SCS, as is evidenced by another secret document. According to the document, the SCS operates its own sophisticated listening devices with which they can intercept virtually every popular method of communication: cellular signals, wireless networks and satellite communication.
The necessary equipment is usually installed on the upper floors of the embassy buildings or on rooftops where the technology is covered with screens or Potemkin-like structures that protect it from prying eyes.
That is apparently the case in Berlin, as well. SPIEGEL asked British investigative journalist Duncan Campbell to appraise the setup at the embassy. In 1976, Campbell uncovered the existence of the British intelligence service GCHQ. In his so-called "Echelon Report" in 1999, he described for the European Parliament the existence of the global surveillance network of the same name.
Campbell refers to window-like indentations on the roof of the US Embassy. They are not glazed but rather veneered with "dielectric" material and are painted to blend into the surrounding masonry. This material is permeable even by weak radio signals. The interception technology is located behind these radio-transparent screens, says Campbell. The offices of SCS agents would most likely be located in the same windowless attic.
According to the documents, SCS units can also intercept microwave and millimeter-wave signals. Some programs, such as one entitled "Birdwatcher," deal primarily with encrypted communications in foreign countries and the search for potential access points. Birdwatcher is controlled directly from SCS headquarters in Maryland.
With the growing importance of the Internet, the work of the SCS has changed. Some 80 branches offer "thousands of opportunities on the net" for web-based operations, according to an internal presentation. The organization is now able not only to intercept cellphone calls and satellite communication, but also to proceed against criminals or hackers. From some embassies, the Americans have planted sensors in communications equipment of the respective host countries that are triggered by selected terms.
More on http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html